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It starts out innocently enough - users want to monitor Online data and so run their own copies
of the detector control GUIs in their offices and at home. But over time, the number of processes
making requests for values to display on GUIs, webpages and stripcharts can grow, and affect the
performance of an Input/Output Controller (IOC) such that it is unable to respond to requests from
requests critical to data-taking. At worst, an IOC can hang, its CPU having been allocated 100%
to responding to network requests.
For the BaBar Online Detector Control System, we were able to eliminate this problem and make
great gains in security by moving all of the IOCs to a non-routed, virtual LAN and by enlisting a
workstation with two network interface cards to act as the interface between the virtual LAN and
the public BaBar network. On the interface machine, we run the Experimental Physics Industrial
Control System (EPICS) Channel Access (CA) gateway software (originating from Advanced Photon
Source). This software accepts as inputs, all the channels which are loaded into the EPICS databases
on all the IOCs. It polls them to update its copy of the values. It answers requests from applications
by sending them the currently cached value.
We adopted the requirement that data-taking would be independent of the gateway, so that, in the
event of a gateway failure, data-taking would be uninterrupted. In this way, we avoided introducing
any new risk elements to data-taking. Security rules already in use by the IOC were propagated to
the gateway’s own security rules and the security of the IOCs themselves was improved by removing
them from the public BaBar network.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes the motivation behind and im-
plementation of a CA Gateway [1] in the BaBar Online
Detector Controls System.
II. MOTIVATION
With the IOCs on the BaBar public network, there
were no limits on the number of clients (aside from
the limit of 384 ssh sessions) that could connect and
request values. These clients could run on any of the
63 workstations on the BaBar public network. Remote
access to the BaBar public network was possible via
ssh.
As a result, the number of open file descriptors on
an IOC could exceed the 150 limit (already increased
significantly from the default 50) and the CPU usage
of an IOC could go as high as 100
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The IOCs were moved to a private network and the
four servers running EPICS client software that were
essential for data-taking were given a secondary net-
work interface so that they could access the private
network. CA gateway software was installed on one
of these servers, ”bbr-srv01”. Statistics of the gate-
way are displayed instantaneously in Figure 1 and over
time in Figure 2.
The gateway acts as a client to the IOCs, requesting
FIG. 1: CA gateway statistics.
channels and receiving replies at the rate of approxi-
mately 285 channels per sec (Figure 1).
The gateway also acts as a server, providing a
cached superset of all the IOCs’ values to public
EPICS clients. In Figure 1, we see that the number of
channels active in the current cache is 15692 and the
number of channels that will be held in the cache for
up to two more hours is 17854.
The server is receiving requests and responding to
them at the rate of 1343.56 channels per second. The
software was built without the flags to monitor the
number of file descriptors in use, so this explains
”FDs: 0”.
Plotted against time (Figure 2), we see that the
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FIG. 2: CA gateway statistics as a function of time.
number of alive and active channels is near constant
and that there are small fluctuations in the event and
post rates.
The dual network interface card (NIC) servers re-
quired a special EPICS configuration to avoid seeing
ambiguous replies to their request for data (since they
could access both the IOCs directly and the CA gate-
way for values).
The BaBar private network is not routed, so IOCs
are hidden from the public internet address space.
IOCs use security access files to define access secu-
rity groups and rules to specify which users can carry
out which actions. For example, the access security
group “dchexpert” may contain a list of users who
are allowed to turn on the high voltage for the drift
chamber. A security access file for the gateway was
constructed from the sum of the individual IOC ac-
cess security files. The userid running the gateway
processes had to be added to the individual IOC’s se-
curity rules since requests to do secure transactions at
the IOC level were being made by the gateway process
and not the expert user, if initiated from the public
network.
IV. RESULTS
The number of file descriptors decreased by 25%
and the CPU usage decreased by 20–40%, on av-
erage for the 17 IOCs. There were fewer IOC
hangs/disconnects which helped to improve BaBar’s
data-taking efficiency.
Internal IOC security is maintained by propagating
the IOC security access definitions to the gateway se-
curity definitions. External IOC security is improved
since IOCs are no longer publicly visible.
[1] http://www-csr.bessy.de/control/SoftDist/Gateway
V. APPENDIX
The poster displayed at CHEP 2003, in two halves
(Figures 3 and 4).
TUJP002
C
o
m
p
u
tin
g
in
H
ig
h
E
n
e
rg
y
a
n
d
N
u
c
lea
r
P
h
y
sic
s,
L
a
J
o
lla
,
C
a
lifo
rn
ia
,
M
a
rc
h
2
4
-2
8
,
2
0
0
3
3
17 Input/Output Controllers (IOCs) running VxWorks
Control Hardware and Instrumentation
BaBar Public Network
42 wkstns used by experts
to monitor operations, test and 
make modifications
from requests critical to data−taking. At worst, an IOC can hang, its CPU
GUIs, webpages and stripcharts can grow, and affect the performance of an
over time, the number of processes making requests for values to display on
their own copies of the detector control GUIs in their offices and at home. But
having been allocated 100% to responding to network requests.
polls them to update its copy of the values. It answers requests from applications 
all the channels which are loaded into the EPICS databases on all the IOCs. It
Industrial Control System (EPICS) Channel Access (CA) gateway software
interface cards to act as the interface between the virtual LAN and the public
non−routed, virtual LAN. By enlisting a workstation with two network
For the BaBar Online Detector Control System, we were able to eliminate this
problem and make great gains in security by moving all of the IOCs to a 
It starts out innocently enough − users want to monitor Online data and so run
Abstract
by sending them the currently cached value.
improved by removing them from the public BaBar network.
gateway’s own security rules and the security of the IOCs themselves was
data−taking. Security rules already in use by the IOC were propagated to the
gateway, so that, in the event of a gateway failure, data−taking would be
at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Sample Channel Access (CA) monitoring client
Sample Channel Access (CA) control client
Before
(up to maximum 384 remote ssh sessions)
Pathway to Main Control Center
incoming UDP broadcast
from IOC
(PV)
TCP/IP connection to obtain PV
incoming UDP broadcast
from each IOC
(beacon)
to control detector
21 wkstns used by operators
or until ca_clear_channel is called for all PVs on that server
Socket is reused if other PVs needed from same CA server
to list of CA Servers in EPICS_CA_ADDR_LIST
− broadcasts a request on UDP EPICS_CA_SERVER_PORT
− listens for CA Server beacons on UDP port 
caRepeater process on each wkstn:
− fans out beacons to registered CA clients
  on this wkstn (not drawn)
CA client application:
− receives UDP broadcasted answer to PV request
− initiates TCP/IP connection to CA server with the PV
On every workstation running CA clients...
CA Server on each IOC
broadcasts that it has PV
for Process Variable (PV)
keeping connection open until beacons lapse beyond timeout
CA Server on each IOC
broadcasts beacons every 15 s
on UDP EPICS_CA_REPEATER_PORT
TCP/IP connection to obtain PV
Outgoing UDP broadcast for PV
1
on UDP EPICS_CA_SERVER_PORT
4
2
3
Incoming request for PV
on UDP EPICS_CA_SERVER_PORT
Input/Output Controller (IOC) such that it is unable to respond to requests
originating from Advanced Photon Source (APS). This software accepts as inputs, 
We gave ourselves the requirement that data−taking would be independent of the
BaBar Network. On the interface machine, we run the Experimental Physics
uninterrupted. In this way, we avoided introducing any new risk elements to 
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Telco/LAN  Router
FIG. 3: CHEP03 poster.
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acts as CA client
Pathway to Main Control Center
42 wkstns used by experts to monitor operations,
test and make modifications
17 Input/Output Controllers (IOCs) running VxWorks
18 wkstns used by operators to control detector
After
Dayle Kotturi, BaBar Computing Group,  March, 2003
CA Server on each IOC
broadcasts beacons every 15 s
on UDP EPICS_CA_REPEATER_PORT
caching available PVs
acts as CA server
serving PVs to clients
Control Hardware and Instrumentation
Gateway Workstation
Detector Controls BaBar Public Network
Private Network
TCP/IP connection to transfer PV
TCP/IP connection to transfer PV
to gateway cache
− configured not to see Gateway wkstn
− they talk directly to IOCs for PVs
− no dependency on gateway 
3 wkstns used by operators to control detector
to controls wkstn
TCP/IP connection to transfer PV
TCP/IP connection to transfer PV
from gateway cache
from gateway cache
Gateway sends beacons
Gateway broadcasts that it has PV
CA client broadcast request for PV
CA client broadcast request for PV
The Two Sides of the
sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra−60
gateway process uses 5−10% CPU
Gateway behaviour over timeInstantaneous gateway behaviour
rates at which CA Clients are requesting (Hz)
number of channels recently requested
rates at which CA Servers are responding (Hz)
number of channels currently requested
 
Security
Incoming write request from BaBar Public CA client app
is verified by gateway’s security rules. If permitted, request 
is passed to IOC for internal verification
Network security is improved
IOCs not visible from BaBar Public Network
CA Security is in place at two levels: CPU load on IOCs reduced by 20−40%
Performance
Benefits
# open file descriptors on IOCs reduced by 25%
fewer IOC hangs/disconnects
Telco/LAN  Router
FIG. 4: CHEP03 poster contd.
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